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Criminal Justice Profiling and EU Data Protection Law: Precarious 
Protection from Predictive Policing  
 
 
Orla Lynskey* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article examines the application of the latest iterations of EU data protection law―in the 
General Data Protection Regulation, the Law Enforcement Directive, and the jurisprudence of 
the CJEU)―to the use of predictive policing technologies. It suggests that the protection 
offered by this legal framework to those impacted by predictive policing technologies is, at 
best, precarious. Whether predictive policing technologies fall within the scope of the data 
protection rules is uncertain, even in light of the expansive interpretation of these rules by the 
CJEU. Such a determination would require a context specific assessment which individuals 
will be ill-placed to conduct. Moreover, even should the rules apply, the substantive protection 
offered by the prohibition against automated decision-making can be easily side-stepped and 
is subject to significant caveats. Again, this points to the conclusion that the protection offered 
by this framework may be more illusory than real. This being so, there are some fundamental 
questions to be answered―including the question of whether we should be building predictive 
policing technologies at all. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
All four vectors of change analysed in this special issue―from technological assistance to 
replacement, from non-automated to automated processes, from humans being in the loop to 
being out of the loop, and from ex post to ex ante criminal justice―are present when law 
enforcement authorities deploy technologies to facilitate ‘predictive policing’. Predictive 
policing is defined as ‘any policing strategy or tactic that develops and uses information and 
advanced analysis to inform forward-thinking crime prevention’ (Uchida, 2009). The 
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automated analysis of data for predictive purposes is a foundational concern of EU data 
protection law, reflected in the prescient inclusion in the 1995 Data Protection Directive1 of a 
provision offering individuals a right not be to subject to automated decision-making.  
However, doctrinal scholars have tended to focus on the commercial deployment of profiling 
and prediction techniques, in particular in the context of online behavioural advertising. 
Normative scholars have, for their part, identified the challenges that such a shift to automated 
decision-making will entail, with an entire field of interdisciplinary work coalescing around 
the notion of fair, accountable and transparent machine-learning, or what could perhaps 
cumulatively be referred to as algorithmic due process (Keats Citron and Pasquale, 2014).  
 
The EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)2, which entered into force in May 2018, 
provided a legal response to these normative challenges and, as such, attracted significant 
academic attention regarding the relevance of its provisions to automated decision-making (the 
lively disagreement between, inter alia, Wachter, Mittelstadt and Floridi and Selbst and Powles 
in 2017 editions of International Data Privacy Law being one case in point). Although, as 
mentioned above, the 1995 Directive provided for similar protection,  the GDPR’s provisions 
have captured the zeitgeist, in particular in relation to how they apply to the provision of ‘free’ 
personalised digital services where the harvesting of personal data acts as the quid pro quo for 
access to the service.  
 
Thus, while the use of profiling techniques by the public sector, including in the context of 
criminal justice, has attracted the attention of normative scholarsthere has been comparatively 
little scholarship on such criminal justice usage from a doctrinal perspective (with some 
exceptions, most recently Garstka, 2018). Indeed, it is the lesser known and discussed 
legislative reform accompanying the GDPR, the Law Enforcement Directive (LED)3, which 
                                                        
1  European Parliament and Council Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995] 
OJ L281/23. 
 
2  Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) 2016 OJ L 119/1.  
 
3  Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes 
of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal 
penalties. [2016] OJ L119/89.  
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will, ordinarily, govern automated decision-making in the context of law enforcement activities 
(the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences, or the execution 
of criminal penalties). This contribution therefore focuses on these predictive policing 
technologies through the under-utilised doctrinal lens.It emerges from this scrutiny that the law 
in this area is both under-developed and of potentially little assistance to those affected by the 
use of predictive policing technologies. It is under-developed as fundamental questions, such 
as whether the processing of personal data required by predictive policing technologies falls 
within the scope of data protection law, are difficult to answer with certainty. It may be of little 
substantive assistance to those impacted by these technologies as the substantive protection it 
offers in the event of automated decision-making is subject to a number of powerful caveats 
and provisos.   
 
Before elaborating on this reasoning, it is worth noting that this contribution does not claim to 
be its exhaustive in its application of the data protection rules to the predictive policing context. 
As such, important questions such as who is responsible for data processing (ie the data 
controller) and how the data protection safeguards (Article 4 LED) apply in the predictive 
policing context are not addressed and merit separate future consideration.  
 
 
2. Identifying the Relevant Legal Framework  
 
Prior to the entry into force of the EU’s Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the EU was legally comprised 
of three distinct pillars: one pillar each respectively for the European Communities; the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy; and Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal 
Matters. This structure assured that the more extensive judicial oversight and more stringent 
legislative procedures that were applied in the context of first pillar internal market measures, 
such as the Data Protection Directive, were not applied to the second and third pillars, the latter 
being areas more directly linked to the sovereignty of Member States. Despite the collapse of 
this pillar system by the Lisbon Treaty, and the introduction of an explicit legal basis for all 
EU data protection laws in Article 16 TFEU, the EU legal framework for data protection 
remains differentiated along these historic lines.  
 
The data protection reform package that culminated in the entry into force of the GDPR and 
the LED in 2018 continues to separate data processing for law enforcement purposes from 
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‘general’ data processing operations, a possibility that was foreseen in Declaration No 21 which 
accompanied the Lisbon Treaty. This section shall therefore provide a brief overview of the 
relevant legal framework applicable to data processing in the criminal justice context.  
 
 
2.1 The legislative framework  
 
The 2018 legislative package incorporates two legal instruments: the GDPR and the LED. The 
GDPR, as its title suggests, sets out a generally applicable framework that regulates the 
processing of personal data (Article 2(2) GDPR). This Regulation is generous in scope, as 
discussed below, with the core concepts of ‘personal data’ and ‘processing’ being expansively 
defined and interpreted. Once within the Regulation’s scope, individual ‘data subjects’ are the 
beneficiaries of certain rights, the cornerstone of which – a right to access their personal data 
– enables a number of corollary rights (Articles 12-22 GDPR), such as a right to rectify or 
erase. Data controllers, those who determine the purposes and means of personal data 
processing, are accountable for this processing pursuant to the GDPR (Article 5(2) GDPR). 
Controllers must respect the principles, or safeguards, relating to personal data processing and 
ensure the lawfulness of that processing (Articles 5 and 6 GDPR).  
 
The GDPR allows Member States to enact limitations to specified Chapters or provisions in 
certain contexts, notably where necessary to reconcile data protection rights with freedom of 
information and expression (Article 85) or for archiving and related purposes (Article 89). It 
also allows Member States to introduce legislation restricting the application of the 
aforementioned data protection principles and rights in order to pursue specified purposes, 
including national security; defence; public security; and, law enforcement purposes (Article 
23), provided this restriction is necessary and proportionate in a democratic society and 
respects the essence of fundamental rights and freedoms. However, beyond these possible 
restrictions to specific provisions, Article 2(2) GDPR also excludes from its scope entirely 
certain other policies, including: policies on border checks, asylum and immigration and police 
and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (Article 2(2)(b) GDPR); data processing in the 
course of an activity which falls outside the scope of Union law (Article 2(2)(a) GDPR); and, 
data processing by competent authorities for the prevention, investigation, detection or 
prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, including the 
safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to public security (Article 2(2)(d) GDPR). 
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Article 2(2)(d) GDPR therefore paves the way for the LED which applies to precisely this 
activity: namely, data processing by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, 
investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal 
penalties, including the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to public security. 
This explicit exclusion of ‘law enforcement data processing’ from the GDPR may give the 
initial misleading impression that the division of labour between the two legislative instruments 
is clear. However, the interplay between these two potentially relevant instruments is, in fact, 
more complicated.  
 
First, it is worth emphasising that in order to fall within the scope of the LED, the data 
processing must be undertaken by a ‘competent authority’. A competent authority is defined in 
Article 3(7)(a) and (b) LED as  
 
any public authority competent for the prevention, investigation, detection or 
prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, including the 
safeguarding against and prevention of threats to public security; or any other body or 
entity entrusted by Member State law to exercise public authority and public powers 
for these purposes.  
 
A private actor conducting data processing for law enforcement purposes therefore needs to be 
entrusted with this role by Member State law before it is removed from the material scope of 
the GDPR and the relevant provisions of the LED apply instead. It follows that in the absence 
of such a legislative enactment, the provisions of the GDPR continue to apply to private entities 
processing personal data for law enforcement purposes. This is implicitly confirmed by Article 
23 GDPR: this provision allows Union or Member State law to restrict the obligations 
stemming from specified GDPR provisions where such a restriction is necessary for law 
enforcement purposes, thus acknowledging that the GDPR would otherwise apply to such 
processing in certain circumstances. A lot therefore turns on the designation of a ‘competent 
authority’ for LED purposes, and when a private entity could be said to be entrusted by law 
with such status. Nevertheless, one might query, for instance, whether ‘entrustment’ requires a 
distinct legislative instrument (Garstka, 2018).  
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Secondly, even when data processing is undertaken by a  “competent authority”, whether such 
processing falls within the scope of the GDPR or the LED will depend on the purpose of the 
processing. Thus, when it comes to data sharing by competent authorities, the act of 
transmitting data from a competent authority to a non-competent authority for law enforcement 
purposes is within the scope of the LED (for instance, a data transfer from the police to a private 
predictive policing software provider) while a transfer for non-law enforcement purposes (for 
instance, a data transfer to medical or social services) would be covered by GDPR (Recital 34, 
LED). Equally, where a competent authority initially collects personal data for law 
enforcement purposes but these data are then processed for alternative, non-law enforcement 
purposes, the GDPR applies (Article 9(1) and Recital 11 LED). Garstka characterises the 
switch between legal frameworks, from the LED to GDPR, as a ‘downgrade’, however as shall 
be discussed below the LED is not necessarily more protective than the GDPR when it comes 
to automated decision making (Garstka, 2018).  
 
Perhaps most critically, it may be that neither legal instrument applies to certain personal data 
processing operations. Like the GDPR, the LED does not apply to personal data processing for 
national security purposes (Article 2(3) and recital 14 LED). The LED does however 
incorporate data processing by competent authorities for law enforcement purposes, ‘including 
the safeguarding against and prevention of security threats’ (Article 1(1) read in conjunction 
with Article 2(1) LED). Nevertheless, the distinction between law enforcement activity, public 
security and national security activity is a blurred one. For example, recital 12 states that the 
LED applies to police activities before the police have knowledge of whether an incident is 
criminal in nature and that such activities include coercive measures at demonstrations and 
riots. It might equally be argued by a Member State that State oversight and enforcement at a 
political rally or protest engages national security concerns, with the recent protestations of the 
Gilets Jaunes in France providing a good example(BBC, 2018). Yet, the LED reserves to the 
Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) the controversial task of delineating the dividing line 
between criminal enforcement activity and national security measures through the ostensibly 
innocuous assertion that the notion of ‘criminal offence’, within the meaning of the LED is ‘an 
autonomous concept of EU law’ (recital 13 LED).One could imagine that any attempt by the 
EU to define as ‘criminal’ conduct that would be classified as a ‘national security’ threat will 
be highly contested given that national security is listed amongst the ‘essential State functions’ 
which the Union is required to respect pursuant to Article 4(2) TEU. Indeed, Article 4(2) TEU 
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specifically emphasises that ‘national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member 
State’.  
 
2.2 Article 8 ECHR and the EU Charter  
 
Challenges to the use of data by the State and law enforcement authorities for criminal justice 
purposes have traditionally been anchored in Article 8 ECHR, which provides for the right to 
respect for private life (for instance, S and Marper v UK4). This is for several reasons. Most 
evidently, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights only acquired binding status in December 
2009 by which point a considerable body of Article 8 ECHR jurisprudence had developed. Yet, 
even since the Charter’s entry into force, it has been of limited utility in the policing context as 
the Charter applies to Member States ‘only when they are implementing Union law’ (Article 
51(1) EU Charter). Before the enactment of the LED, no Union law applied to the processing 
of personal data by police authorities for domestic purposes thus excluding the application of 
the Charter to such processing. Now that such legislation does exist, the Charter’s application 
in this context raises queries.  
 
Two issues in particular are likely to be contentious. First, as mentioned above, by reserving 
for the CJEU the competence to define ‘criminal offence’ for the purposes of the LED, the 
LED de facto enables the CJEU to police the outer limits of the concept of ‘national security’. 
A broad interpretation of ‘criminal offence’ could encroach upon what Member States perceive 
to be their exclusive competence in the field of national security and would allow the Charter 
to apply in this new territory. Although Article 6(1) TEU states that the provisions of the 
Charter shall not extend in any way the competences of the Union as defined in the Treaties, 
the CJEU has not hesitated to deploy bold readings of legislative provisions that ensure the 
Charter’s application in contested contexts. For instance, in Tele2 Sverige and Watson,5 
following on from Digital Rights Ireland,6 the Court examined the compatibility of national 
legislative provisions providing for bulk communications metadata retention for law 
enforcement purposes in light of the EU Charter rights to data protection and privacy. What 
                                                        
4  S and Marper v United Kingdom (2009) 48 EHRR 50. 
 
5  Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15, Tele2 Sverige, Watson and Others EU:C:2016:970. 
 
6  Joined Case C-293/12 and 594/12 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd and Seitlinger and others EU:C:2014:238. 
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was notable about this situation was that, at that time, there was no provision of EU law 
regulating retention or access to retained data by law enforcement authorities. The Court 
therefore justified the Charter’s application in a contestable manner. It reasoned that the EU E-
Privacy Directive provides for a right to confidentiality of communications; that Article 15(1) 
E-Privacy Directive provides for exceptions to this principle, including for public security and 
law enforcement purposes; and, that such exceptions must comply with general principles of 
EU law, including fundamental rights. The Court therefore held that national legislative 
measures adopted pursuant to Article 15(1) E-Privacy Directive must be interpreted in light of 
the Charter (Tele2 Sverige and Watson, para 91). The Court proposed this interpretation despite 
the fact that Article 1(3) E-Privacy Directive states that it shall not apply to, inter alia, the 
activities of the State in areas of criminal law. The Court’s application of the Charter provisions 
to communications metadata retention, and in particular its potential encroachment into the 
field of national security, has been contested at national level (see, for example, the pending 
preliminary reference from the UK: Privacy International7). Secondly, the level of protection 
offered by the LED is not identical to that offered by the GDPR. One may therefore wonder 
whether such differentiated protection, such as the omission of certain ‘due process’ safeguards 
in the context of automated decision-making in the LED (as discussed below), is in fact 
compatible with the Charter right to data protection.  
 
3. The Deployment of Intrusive  Profiling Technologies  
 
According to Big Brother Watch, a civil society organisation in the UK, there is an increasing 
trend for police forces in the UK to acquire, develop and operationally deploy technologies that 
are intrusive, untested and of questionable compatibility with fundamental rights (Big Brother 
Watch, 2018). One such range of technologies are those used for ‘predictive policing’ purposes. 
Predictive policing is, as mentioned above, any policing strategy or tactic that develops and 
uses information and advanced analysis to inform forward-thinking crime prevention. Degeling 
and Berendt specify that such policing encompasses the ‘variety of techniques used by police 
departments to generate and act on crime probabilities, often referred to as predictions’ 
(Degeling and Berendt, 2018). It is thus the ostensible capability to predict future criminal 
outcomes based on big data analytics that is the decisive characteristic of these predictive 
                                                        
7  Case C-623/17 Privacy International [2018] OJ C22/29 (pending). 
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policing technologies. Numerous categories of predictive policing have been identified in the 
literature. For instance, Oswald et al, identify three contexts in which predictive policing 
occurs: it can be incorporated into strategic planning and prioritising on a macro-level; it can 
be used to link operational intelligence; and, it can be used to make decisions or risk-
assessments in relation to individuals (Oswald et al, 2018). Broadly, speaking therefore, 
predictive policing can be used to make both systemic decisions (perhaps relating to times and 
places of crimes) as well as identification decisions (for instance, predicting the identity of 
criminal offenders or victims of crime) (van Brackel, 2016).  Before analysing whether and 
how data protection law constrains suchpolicing predictions, a brief overview of an application 
illustrative of systemic and identification decision making respectively will be provided.  
3.1 Applications of predictive policing  
 
Systemic decisions in this context are aggregate predictions regarding future criminal activity. 
This form of predictive policing has been the most widely adopted. It seeks to undertake what 
van Brakel labels ‘predictive mapping’ (or geo-spatial crime prediction): identifying when and 
where crimes may take place based on an aggregate level analysis. The most well-known 
commericalexample of this predictive mapping is the PredPol application. According to its 
website, PredPol sells a web application to police forces making predictions about possible 
future crime hotspots. PredPol was developed by researchers at UCLA and is now used by over 
60 US police departments. In the UK, Kent Police uses the software (Dencik et al, 2018). 
PredPol is sold as a ‘Software as a Service’ package which means that it is run on centrally 
controlled servers rather than locally by each police force using it. The application can then be 
accessed using an ordinary web browser.  
 
PredPol was inspired by the use of seismology algorithms. In seismology, aftershocks often 
occur after a first earthquake: it is therefore possible to assume that after a first earthquake, the 
likelihood of a repeat event increases. PredPol, using a ‘near repeat theory’ model, extends this 
logic to the criminal context where certain crimes, most clearly burglary, occur in quick 
succession in close proximity to the initial crime (although, as Degeling and Berendt note, only 
a fraction of crimes can be considered ‘near repeat’). In predicting ‘crime hotspots’, PredPol 
makes use of three data variables: crime type; crime location; and timing data (date and time).   
 
Predictive mapping, or geo-spatial crime prediction, technologies have been developed over 
time with risk terrain modelling, as commercialised by Hunchlab, being one example of this. 
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While this model is still rooted in geo-spatial crime prediction, it entails the creation of a 
‘composite “risk terrain” map with values that account for all risk factors at every place 
throughout the geography’ (Caplan et al, 2015). Degeling and Berendt distinguish between the 
two by highlighting that near repeat theory focuses on internal/endogenous factors (such as 
repetitive criminal behaviour), risk terrain modelling incorporates exogenous factors into this 
assessment (for instance, the location of bars or parks). The environmental factors that 
potentially contribute to particular criminal activity (e.g., dimly lit areas in urban environments; 
or potential drug-dealing in parks) can be factored into risk terrain modelling. This does, 
however, put an onus on those using this technology ‘to constantly update their dataset and 
inform the algorithms about any change of usage of buildings, construction sites or the location 
of events’ (Degeling and Berendt, 2018).  
 
The second broad category of predictive policing applications are those that are used to make 
identification decisions, that is predictions regarding actual or potential offenders. Unlike 
systemic decisions, predictive identification focuses on identifying criminal behaviour at 
individual or group level. In particular, such systems seek to calculate the likelihood that a 
given person will commit a crime, or their likelihood of being prone to criminal behaviour. A 
well-known example of such identification profiling is used in Chicago where the police 
department analyses networks of those arrested in order to calculate the likelihood of an 
individual being involved in a serious crime. In order to compile a ‘heat list’ of names of those 
likely to be involved in major crimes, various data points are analysed by the police. Individuals 
on this list are then provided with a ‘custom notification letter’ by the police that warns them, 
in advance, about any charges they may face should they engage in criminal activities. In the 
UK, the Durham Constabulary in conjunction with statistical researchers at the University of 
Cambridge developed a ‘Harm Assessment Risk Tool’ (HART) to assess risk of future 
offending and to provide those offenders classified as ‘moderate risk’ with the opportunity to 
participate in a rehabilitation programme. HART is explicitly designed to aid custody officers 
in their decision-making regarding eligibility, rather than to make this decision for them 
(Oswald et al, 2016). According to Oswald et al, the HART model is built using approximately 
104,000 ‘custody events’ over the five year period between 2008 and 2012. Forecasts are 
determined based on 34 distinct predictors, 29 of which focus upon the suspect’s offending 
history with the remaining five being age; gender; two forms of residential postcode; and ‘the 
count of existing police intelligence reports relating to the offender’ (Oswald et al, 2016). Big 
Brother Watch has indicated that the residential postcode data is based on a tool offered by 
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Experian, a global data broker which it suggests uses 850 million data points, including 
information on child benefits and support and data scraped online, to create a ‘postcode 
stereotype’ (Big Brother Watch, 2018). 
 
 The HART model intentionally favours so called ‘cautious error’ over ‘dangerous error’: a 
dangerous error would under-estimate the offender’s risk of re-offending while a cautious error 
would over-estimate the risk of re-offending. While the accuracy rate of the HART model was 
assessed to be 62.8% in 2012, which reflected a drop from the initial construction estimate of 
68.5%, Oswald et al emphasise that the rates of the most dangerous form of error (low risk 
offenders actually being high risk) remained constant and it was cautious errors that were over-
estimated. This means, as they acknowledge, that if the HART prediction was treated as 
decisive, one could argue that an unacceptable number of low and medium risk offenders are 
treated as high risk.  
 
4. The Application of the Under-Developed Data Protection Framework  
 
4.1 The scope of application of EU data protection law  
 
EU data protection provisions apply to the processing of personal data. One preliminary query 
may be whether the two forms of automated decision-making associated with systemic and 
identification predictive policing constitute personal data processing and thus fall within the 
scope of the provisions. ‘Processing’ is an all-encompassing concept defined in Article 3(2) 
LED and Article 4(2) GDPR as:  
 
any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data or on sets of 
personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as collection, recording, 
organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, 
disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or 
combination, restriction, erasure or destruction. 
 
Each stage of the data handling outlined above would therefore constitute data ‘processing’.  
The more interesting question is thus whether it constitutes the processing of personal data. 
Personal data is defined as any information that relates to someone who is identified or 
identifiable on the basis of that data (Article 3(1) LED; Article 4(1) GDPR). Opining in 2007, 
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the Article 29 Working Party, an advisory body on data protection matters constituted under 
the Data Protection Directive, proposed a very broad interpretation of ‘personal data’ (Article 
29 Working Party, 2007). However, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) has also had the 
opportunity to consider this concept in its jurisprudence in recent years, most notably in YS and 
MS8; Breyer9; and Nowak10 and this jurisprudence has not always been unequivocal in 
endorsing such a broad approach to ‘personal data’. Therefore,  as shall be discussed, there 
continues to be doctrinal debate and uncertainty regarding the appropriate reach of this notion 
(see, for instance, Veale et al, 2018).  
 
4.1.1 Parsing the concept of ‘personal data’  
 
The definition of personal data has three constituent elements: personal data is (1) any 
information that (2) relates to (3) an identified or identifiable person. The Article 29 Working 
Party has advised that each of these three elements should be interpreted expansively. It thus 
suggests that ‘any information’ should incorporate objective and subjective information; 
information that is false, and that the format in which the information is provided is not 
relevant. ‘Any information’ also includes information that would not be considered ‘private’ 
for the purposes of the right to respect for private life in Article 8 ECHR (this follows, for 
instance, from Google Spain11).  The CJEU stated in Nowak that the expression ‘any 
information’ is used to reflect the legislature’s aim to ‘assign a wide scope to that concept’. 
The Court continued by stating that it is not restricted to sensitive or private information and 
‘potentially encompasses all kinds of information’, giving the example of subjective 
information (para 34). The Court failed to endorse explicitly all of the examples provided by 
the Article 29 Working Party, while also qualifying its claim that any information encompasses 
all kinds of information (it potentially does so: emphasis added). There is therefore scope for 
the Court to limit its interpretation of this definitional element in the future. Nevertheless, in 
the Court’s existing jurisprudence, the more contested elements of ‘personal data’ are the 
                                                        
8  Joined Cases C-141/12 and 372/12 YS v Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel and Minister 
voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel v MS EU:C:2014:2081. 
 
9  Case C-582/14, Breyer EU:C:2016:779.  
 
10  Case C-434/16, Nowak v Data Protection Commissioner EU:C:2017:994. 
 
11  Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos and Mario 
Costeja González EU:C:2014:317 
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requirements that this information ‘relates to’ an individual and that this individual is 
identifiable.  
 
In its 2007 Opinion, the Article 29 Working Party suggested that information can relate to an 
individual in three ways, namely in terms of its content (when it is about a particular person); 
its purpose (when data are used with the purpose ‘to evaluate, treat in a certain way or influence 
the status or behaviour of an individual’) and its result (when data ‘is likely to have an impact 
on a certain person’s rights and interests, taking into account all the circumstances surrounding 
the precise case’). It further specified that it is not necessary that the data ‘focuses on someone 
in order to consider that it relates to him’.  
 
The Court was asked for guidance on this element of the definition in YS. YS concerned three 
non-EU nationals who applied for lawful residence in the Netherlands. During this process, the 
immigration official tasked with assessing the application prepares a draft decision (essentially, 
a recommendation on whether to grant the status requested) and a ‘minute’, which sets out the 
legal reasoning on which the draft decision is based. The minute also contains details of the 
relevant case officer; factual data regarding the applicant (name; nationality etc) as well as the 
documents submitted by the applicant and the procedural history of the claim. Each of the three 
applicants sought access to the minute relating to their application, claiming that under data 
protection law the minute constituted personal data and that they therefore had a right of access 
to such data. It was not contested before the Court that the data contained in the minute about 
the applicant (what might be called the ‘content’ data, such as name, date of birth, gender, 
language, etc.) constituted personal data, and the Court confirmed this finding (para 38). 
However, the Court held that the legal analysis in the minute, which at most ‘is information 
about the assessment and application by the competent authority of the law to the applicant’s 
situation’, did not ‘relate to’ the applicant (para 40). It was therefore not personal data (para 
39). The Court claimed this conclusion was borne out by the objective and general scheme of 
the Data Protection Directive (para 41). In particular, the Court reasoned that the Directive’s 
objectives of protecting the right to privacy are achieved by enabling data subjects to ensure 
that their data are correct and lawfully processed by exercising their right of access to that data 
(para 42-44). It therefore concluded that as the legal analysis in YS was not itself liable to such 
an accuracy check and subsequent rectification, extending access to the legal analysis in this 
case would not serve the Directive’s purposes but would rather constitute a right of access to 
administrative documents (para 45-46).  
14 
 
 
It is suggested that this approach to the interpretation of ‘personal data’is misguided.On the 
one hand, the Court has frequently favoured a teleological or purposive approach to its 
interpretation of the EU data protection rules (as occurred in Google Spain). YS was therefore 
consistent in this regard. On the other hand, the application of data protection law could be 
thought of as a two-stage process. The first stage entails an assessment of whether the 
processing operation fallswithin the scope of the rules with a consideration of which rights and 
responsibilities apply to the processing and how taking place during the second stage. In YS the 
Court allowed its consideration of the second question to influence its adjudication on the first, 
logically prior issue by limiting the concept of ‘personal data’ to ensure an outcome where the 
right to access would not apply. The Court had the opportunity to reconsider this approach in 
Nowak.  
 
Mr Nowak had sat a number of professional examinations in Ireland. Having failed one of these 
examinations on a number of occasions and having unsuccessfully challenged the result of his 
fourth attempt, Mr Nowak then sought access to his personal data from the professional 
association. The professional association provided him with access to 17 documents but refused 
to provide access to his examination script on the grounds that it did not constitute personal 
data. This refusal culminated in a referral by the Irish Supreme Court to the CJEU querying 
whether the information recorded as answers in a professional examination constituted personal 
data and, if so, what factors are relevant in such determination. When considering these 
questions, the Court also assessed whether the comments made by an examiner in respect of 
those answers constitute the candidate’s personal data.  
 
The Court’s analysis focused primarily on when data ‘relates to’ an individual implicitly 
endorsing the Article 29 Working Party’s claim that data relates to a data subject where the 
information ‘by reason of its content, purpose or effect, is linked to a particular person’. The 
Court affirmed that the written answers submitted by an examination candidate are linked to 
that candidate (para 36). It elaborated that the content of the answers reflects the candidate’s 
knowledge and competence (para 37); that the purpose of the data collection is to evaluate the 
candidate (para 38); and, that the use of that information in determining whether the candidate 
passed or failed is likely to have an effect on the candidate’s rights (para 39). With regard to 
the examiner’s comments, the Court held that the content of these comments reflect the opinion 
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or assessment of the examiner of the individual’s performance (para 43). Moreover, the purpose 
of those comments is to record this evaluation and the comments are likely to have effects for 
the candidate (para 43). The Court therefore concluded that such comments could be both the 
personal data of the examination candidate and the personal data of the examiner (paras 44 and 
45). 
 At this juncture, the Court ostensibly departed from its prior reasoning in YS by disaggregated 
the scope of the rules from the ensuing rights and responsibilities (what it called ‘classification’ 
and ‘consequences’). It noted that whether these answers and comments should be classified 
as personal data cannot be affected by the fact that the consequence of the classification is, in 
principle, that the candidate then has a right to access and rectification (para 46). The Court 
noted that if data is not classified as ‘personal data’ it has the effect of entirely excluding that 
data from data protection’s principles and safeguards and its rights (para 49). It then went on 
to elaborate on how principles such as the accuracy and completeness of this data, as well as 
rights such as the right to rectification, may be relevant in the examination context. This led it 
to conclude that in so far as these answers and comments are liable to be checked for accuracy 
and retention and to be subject to rectification or erasure giving the candidate a right of access 
to both serves ‘the purpose of the Directive of guaranteeing the protection of that candidate’s 
right to privacy …(see, a contrario, ..YS and others)’ (para 56).  
The Court’s enigmatic reference to YS leaves room for disagreement as to when data ‘relates 
to’ an individual. It could be argued that YS is no longer good law following Nowak and that 
the Court used the opportunity presented to endorse the broad Article 29 Working Party 
conception of personal data. However, an alternative interpretation is also possible: that YS still 
stands and can be distinguished from Nowak because in the latter it was possible for Mr Nowak 
to carry out the ‘necessary checks’ to ensure that his  personal data was  correct and lawfully 
processed and thus this constituted personal data. In sum, we can see that, as with the term ‘any 
information’, there remains scope for contestation regarding the meaning of the term ‘relates 
to’.   
 
According to the GDPR, an identifiable person is one ‘who can be identified, directly or 
indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors 
specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity’ (Article 
4(1) GDPR.). Recital 26 specifies that to determine whether a natural person is identifiable, 
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‘account should be taken of all the means likely reasonably to be used either by the controller 
or by any other person to identify the said person’. In Breyer Mr Breyer had contested the 
registration and storage of his dynamic internet protocol (IP) address by the German State when 
he accessed several internet sites run by the German federal institutions. The State also 
recorded the date on which the website was accessed.  
 
The classification of the IP address as ‘personal data’ therefore turned on whether Mr Breyer 
is ‘identifiable’ on the basis of this address, given that the additional data necessary for the 
German State to identify the website user are held by the user’s internet service provider (ISP) 
(para 39). This gave the Court the opportunity to consider the meaning of ‘indirect’ 
identification involving ‘all the means likely reasonably to be used’ by either the controller or 
by ‘any other person’. It found that this wording indicates that it is ‘not required that all the 
information enabling the identification of the data subject must be in the hands of one person’ 
(para 43). It thus examined whether the possibility for the German State to combine the 
dynamic IP address with the additional identifying information held by the ISP constituted a 
means likely reasonably to be used. It held that such identification would not be possible if it 
was prohibited by law or ‘practically impossible, on account of the fact that it requires a 
disproportionate effort in terms of time, cost and man-power’ (para 46). The Court observed 
that while German law does not generally allow for the transmission of such information 
between the ISP and the State, in the event of issues such as cyber-attacks ‘legal channels exist’ 
for website providers to contact competent authorities who in turn can take the steps necessary 
to obtain this identifying information from ISPs (para 47). On this basis, the Court concluded 
that the website operators had the means ‘which may likely reasonably be used’ in order to 
identify the data subject, with the help of competent authorities and the ISP and thus that the 
dynamic IP address constituted personal data.  
 
It can thus be seen that the concept of ‘identifiability’ has been interpreted extremely liberally, 
with no requirement that the information enabling identification must be in the hands of one 
person and with even very onerous steps constituting ‘means reasonably likely to be used’, 
rather than a ‘disproportionate effort’. Indeed, the Article 29 Working Party had previously 
opined that a ‘purely hypothetical possibility’ of identification does not meet the standard of 
‘likely reasonably to be used’ (Article 29 Working Party, 2007). It suggests that a range of 
factors should be taken into consideration when assessing such likelihood including the 
purposes of the processing (when it ‘only makes sense if it allows identification of specific 
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individuals and treatment of them in a certain way’); the cost of identification and measures in 
place to prevent identification, amongst others. It is necessary now to consider how these 
jurisprudential developments might apply in the context presently being considered.  
 
4.1.2 Application to the predictive policing context  
 
With regard firstly to systemic decisions, it might seem counter-intuitive to a general audience 
to suggest that an application like PredPol which, it is recalled, processes three types of input 
data (crime type; crime location; and timing data) in order to predict potential sites of future 
criminal activity, processes ‘personal data’. The functioning of the application might be 
thought of in three stages: the aggregation and inputting of data; the application of the PredPol 
algorithm to that data; and, the recommendation. Yet, based on the jurisprudence outlined 
above, it is possible that all three stages entail personal data processing. First of all, as Purtova 
notes, the primary reason for information processing in the context of data-driven regulation is 
to treat people in a certain way or to influence human behaviour (Purtova, 2018: 55). The data 
processed at all three stages is therefore likely to ‘relate to’ a data subject by reason of its 
‘purpose’ (to treat people in a certain way) or its ‘effect’ (to impact upon those in the ‘hotspots’ 
identified). Yet, as outlined previously, a narrower interpretation is possible. Arguably post-
Nowak it remains possible that the interpretation of ‘relating to’ will be reverse-engineered by 
the Court, with the Court considering first whether key data protection safeguards and rights 
(such as accuracy and erasure) can be exercised in relation to data before classifying that data 
as personal data.   
 
Whether this data could be linked to an identifiable person is more difficult to establish. It could 
be argued that linking, for instance, crime location data to an individual is hypothetically 
possible but does not meet the ‘likely reasonable’ standard. However, the Court in Breyer held 
that data could be linked to an identifiable person if, where there was a cyber-attack on a 
website, the website owner could liaise with a competent authority who would in turn liaise 
with authorities with identifying information (in that instance, an ISP). Similarly, in this 
context, if a criminal event did occur it seems likely that a competent police authority could 
combine this input data with other data, for instance CCTV footage or mobile phone metadata, 
in order to identify individuals present. This same logic applies also to the other two stages of 
personal data processing.  
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The broad understanding of the concept of ‘personal data’ might therefore be welcomed in this 
context in so far as it includes such uses of technology within the protective scope of the data 
protection rules. Prior to these judgments, it was clear that while the identification of potential 
crime hotspots might have ethical implications, it was less clearwhether identifiability required 
a ‘singling out’ of particular individuals rather than a geographic area to be captured by data 
protection law. Indeed, Taylor had warned that in order to operationalise the concept of data 
justice in the context of new technologies that tended ‘to sort, profile and inform action based 
on group rather than individual characteristics and behaviour…it is inevitably going to be 
necessary to look beyond the individual level’ (Taylor, 2017). Yet, whether intentionally or 
inadvertently, this case law now seems to extend the application of data protection rules to 
almost all forms of data, irrespective of its proximity to the data subject. Purtova provocatively, 
yet quite rightly, queries whether even weather data collected as part of a smart-city project 
might be classified as personal data pursuant to this broad approach, eventually turning ‘data 
protection law into an uneconomical exercise of regulating everything’ (Purtova, 2018). 
 
Given that systemic decisions likely constitute personal data processing, it is unsurprising that 
identification decisions also entail such processing. HART provides a good example of this. 
The input data – the 34 predictors based on the offender’s personal history – are personal data 
as their content concerns an identified person while the output data – a suggested likelihood of 
reoffending – is personal data as its purpose and effect is to influence an identified individual’s 
future prospects. It is perhaps less clear that the ‘middle’ processing stage – where the 
programme’s algorithm is applied to the input data – is personal data based on YS and Nowak.  
Based on Nowak, it could be argued that the application of the machine learning model used 
by HART to the 34 predictors input into the system is personal data.  However, if Nowak did 
not overrule YS, then it is perhaps necessary to consider whether – in defining it as personal 
data – the protections that would follow from that classification, such as the right to erase or 
rectify, are theoretically and practically available. If this was what the Court was in fact 
proposing in Nowak, one must remark that it makes the applicability of data protection difficult 
to predict, particularly for the individuals, the ostensible beneficiaries of the regime.  
 
Thus, in conclusion, it can be seen that it is likely, yet not certain, that these two forms of 
predictive policing models will fall within the scope of application of the data protection 
framework. Key aspects of the concept ‘personal data’ which determines what processing 
activities these rules cover are subject to contestation and will require further jurisprudential 
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clarification. Furthermore, as shall now be discussed, even assuming these models fall within 
the scope of the rules, the protection they offer to individuals impacted by such processing is 
precarious.  
 
4.2 Substantive rights and predictive policing  
 
The LED defines profiling in the same way as the GDPR: profiling is ‘any form of automated 
processing of personal data consisting of the use of personal data to evaluate certain personal 
aspects relating to a natural person, in particular to analyse or predict aspects concerning that 
natural person’s performance at work, economic situation, health, personal preferences, 
interests, reliability, behaviour, location or movements’ (Article 3(4) LED; Article 4(4) 
GDPR.). If, as suggested above, predictive policing systems entail the processing of personal 
data, then it follows that those systems are ‘profiling’ systems in that they predict aspects 
relating to a natural person’s reliability and behaviour as well as potentially their location and 
movements. Profiling is itself thus a form of automated decision-making (Article 29 Working 
Party, 2017).  
 
Article 11(1) LED prohibits decisions based solely on automated processing in certain 
circumstances. This provision is worded similarly to Article 22 GDPR leading the Article 29 
Working Party to indicate that its guidelines on Article 22 GDPR are relevant to Article 11 
LED, ‘albeit with important caveats and specifications’ (Article 29 Working Party, 2017). 
 
It is worth setting out Article 11 LED in full:  
 
Member States shall provide for a decision based solely on automated processing, 
including profiling, which produces an adverse legal effect concerning the data subject 
or significantly affects him or her, to be prohibited unless authorised by Union or 
Member State law to which the controller is subject and which provides appropriate 
safeguards for the rights and freedoms of the data subject, at least the right to obtain 
human intervention on the part of the controller. 
 
One immediate observation about this provision is that, unlike Article 22 GDPR which is 
framed as a right of the data subject ( the ‘data subject shall have the right not to be subject to 
a decision based solely on automated processing’), Article 11 LED is framed as a prohibition. 
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On paper, Article 11 LED is therefore phrased in a more robust and protective way than its 
GDPR counterpart. This has led the Article 29 Working Party to recommend that Article 22 
GDPR nevertheless be applied as a prohibition (Article 29 Working Party, 2018).  As Kaminski 
has noted, interpreting Article 22 GDPR as a right would, perhaps counterintuitively, limit the 
protection it offered by allowing data controllers to ‘regularly use algorithms in significant 
decision-making, adjusting their behaviour only if individuals actually invoke their rights’ 
(Kaminski, 2018).  
 
Yet, despite its tougher exterior, it is immediately apparent that the Article 11 LED prohibition 
is subject to a number of limitations. Most notably, like Article 22 GDPR, automated decision-
making is permissible when provided for by Union or Member State law. By enacting 
legislation, Member States can therefore legitimise reliance by law enforcement authorities on 
fully automated-decision making to make systemic and/or individualised predictions regarding 
future criminal conduct. Very importantly, and in accordance with EU anti-discrimination law 
and the EU Charter (as per recital 38 LED), the LED does however put in place a per se 
prohibition on profiling that leads to discrimination on the basis of sensitive data (Article 11(3) 
LED). Moreover, unlike the GDPR, which allows for automated decision-making if it is 
necessary for contractual purposes or is based on the data subject’s explicit consent, this is not 
possible under Article 11 LED. The obvious explanation for this is that ‘there is a clear 
imbalance of powers between the data subject and the controller’ in this context (Article 29 
Working Party, 2017). Indeed, the Court has recognised the limitations of consent when 
citizens do not have the ability to object to data processing (in situ, the ability to object to 
fingerprints being used for a passport application.12   
 
However, while the GDPR does allow for automated decision-making in a wider range of 
circumstances, it also provides for a wider array of safeguards for individuals. The LED allows 
automated decision-making if authorized by Union or Member State law, subject to the 
condition that such law ‘provides appropriate safeguards for the rights and freedoms of data 
subjects, at least the right to obtain human intervention on the part of the controller’. The non-
binding recital further specifies that in order to be significant human intervention ‘must be 
carried out by someone who has the appropriate authority and capability to change the decision’ 
(Recital 38). In contrast, Article 22(3) GDPR sets out further safeguards in addition to this 
                                                        
12   Case C-291/12, Michael Schwarz v Stadt Bochum EU:C:2013:670 
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‘human intervention’ criterion. It specifies that the data subject shall have the right to express 
their point of view and to contest the decision. This may indicate that these latter safeguards – 
the right to express their point of view and to contest the decision – are not required under the 
LED. The LED is not however a directive of maximum harmonisation and it explicitly states 
that Member States can provide for a higher level of protection: how this provision is 
transposed domestically will therefore be of real importance for the rights of data subjects 
(Recital 15; Article 1(3) LED). Moreover, when the automated decision-making is based on 
sensitive data, Article 11(2) LED specifies that such decision-making shall not occur unless 
suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s rights and freedoms and legitimate interests 
are in place. Member States are therefore left with a lot of responsibility – and discretion – 
when it comes to ensuring the rights of individuals, albeit that any national implementing 
legislation must be compatible with the EU Charter.  
 
Beyond the significant possibility to side-step the prohibition on automated decision-making 
through legislation, Article 11 LED is limited in other notable ways. Most importantly, the 
LED applies only to automated decisions based solely on automated processing. As a result, it 
is questionable, for instance, whether the recommendation generated by HART for relevant 
officers regarding rehabilitation prospects is one which is based ‘solely’ on automated 
processing. This depends on how the decision-making process occurs in practice. In this 
context, one would need to gauge to what extent the final decision entails the discretion and 
judgment of the officer making that decision. If, for instance, the relevant officers ‘(consciously 
or otherwise) prefer to abdicate responsibility for what are risky decisions to the algorithm’, 
then in addition to the deskilling and judgmental atrophy that might follow (Oswald et al, 2018), 
such decisions should also de facto be viewed as automated. However, if the decisive decision 
incorporates human judgement and is the final recommendation of the relevant officer then this 
is not solely automated and Article 11 LED does not apply. 
 
The next query would be whether this decision has a sufficient impact to trigger the application 
of Article 11 LED. To have such an impact, an automated decision must have an ‘adverse legal 
effect’ on the individual or ‘significantly affect’ them. The wording of Article 11 LED differs 
slightly in this regard from the GDPR, which requires the decision to produce ‘legal effects’ or 
to ‘similarly significantly affect’ the data subject. Under the LED, unlike the GDPR, the legal 
effect must be adverse. The Article 29 Working Party provides an example of a ‘typical’ 
adverse effect: namely, the application of increased security measures or surveillance by 
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competent authorities. A measure ‘significantly affects’ the individual where, for example, a 
passenger is refused access to transport as they are registered on a black-list (Article 29 
Working Party, 2017). For both Article 11 LED and Article 22 GDPR, automated decision-
making with a ‘trivial effect’ would not be considered sufficient for the prohibition to apply. 
Again, there are some open questions when this stipulation is applied to the predictive policing 
context. For instance, in the context of an individualised predictive policing system like HART, 
it is necessarily the case for Article 11 LED to apply that the decision has involved human 
input. It could therefore be argued that it is not the HART recommendation (an interim 
decision, at most) that affects the individual but rather it is the final (human) decision which is 
merely informed by this recommendation. This too would therefore require a close examination 
of how the decision-making procedure operates in practice. More controversially, one could 
query whether the collective adverse effect from the identification of ‘crime hotspots’ by 
systemic predictive policing technologies (such as stigmatisation) would be sufficient to trigger 
Article 11 LED, or whether an individual would need to show adverse effects particular to 
them. Indeed, in  Tele2 Sverige and Watson, the Court adopted an uncritical approach to such 
geographic targeting when it suggested that the targeted retention of data pertaining to 
particular geographic areas would be a preferable alternative to blanket data retention (para. 
108).  
 
Furthermore, the extent to which automated decision-making via predictive policing 
applications might be transparent to those impacted by such applications is unclear. On the one 
hand, Article 24 LED provides that data controllers should maintain a record of all categories 
of processing activities under their responsibility, including where applicable the use of 
profiling. This requirement is not envisaged in such a general manner by the GDPR, and the 
Article 29 Working Party has encouraged Member States to be particularly vigilant in enforcing 
it. On the other hand, unlike the GDPR, Article 13 LED does not explicitly indicate that the 
data subject must be provided with information regarding the existence of automated decision-
making. However, such information may, as the Article 29 Working Party suggested, be 
provided pursuant to Article 13(2)(d) LED which states that Member States shall provide by 
law for the controller to give further information to the data subject to exercise his or her rights. 
Indeed, the Article 29 Working Party highlights that providing appropriate information to the 
data subject regarding the existence of such automated decision-making including profiling, 
and meaningful information about the logic involved is particularly relevant in respect of the 
fairness of data processing, with Article 4(1) providing that data should be processed lawfully 
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and fairly. Once again, a lot will depend on how Member States implement and interpret the 
Directive.  
 
Finally, in practice it may be difficult to disentangle the GDPR from the LED in this context. 
If one considers the application of Articles 11 LED and 22 GDPR to the HART model, one can 
see at once how complicated their application is likely to be in practice. The HART model 
includes 34 predictors that are input into the model. Some of these predictors (those relating to 
prior offences, for instance) are likely to have been initially collected by the ‘competent 
authority’ for law enforcement purposes and thus the LED applies to their processing. This 
data processing may itself give rise to unique challenges: for instance, if data on spent 
convictions is included amongst the predictors. However, the inclusion of Experian data based 
on data scraped from various public sources complicates this picture. The initial processing of 
these personal data would fall within the scope of the GDPR. The creation of the Experian 
‘postcode profile’ could therefore itself be subject to challenge on the ground that it constitutes 
an automated decision (a profile) under Article 22 GDPR. If such a profile has been created 
without a legal basis pursuant to Article 22(2) GDPR, it is a violation of that provision. 
Alternatively, should the profiling be legitimately based on consent, contract or law, it could 
be argued that the profiles themselves constitute unfair data processing, acting, as they do, as 
proxies for direct discrimination. Big Brother Watch has stated that the Experian profiles 
include categories such as ‘Asian Heritage’ and ‘Disconnected Youth’ and that these categories 
have ‘demographic characteristics’ attributed to them. Their report gives the example of the 
demographic characteristics associated with ‘Asian Heritage’ namely ‘extended families’ 
living in ‘inexpensive, close-packed Victorian terraces’, adding that ‘when people do have jobs, 
they are generally in low paid routine occupations in transport or food service’ (Big Brother 
Watch, 2018). One could also query whether the subsequent inclusion of this data into the 
HART application is compatible with Article 11(2) and (3) LED: while it does not directly 
discriminate on the basis of protected characteristics, it does so at least indirectly.  
 
In sum, the substantive protection offered by Article 11 LED may prove illusive for those 
impacted by predictive policing technologies. Member States can dodge the Article 11 LED 
prohibition by putting such technologies on a statutory footing. Furthermore, there is likely to 
be disagreement over the extent of the human intervention and the impact needed to avoid its 
application. Finally, the fluidity of data flows between actors involved in the predictive policing 
process will make even the identification of the appropriate legal regime a challenging task. 
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This uncertainty will make the application of the law difficult for individuals to navigate, 
thereby enhancing the role and importance of national supervisory authorities and 
representative bodies (Articles 45 and 55 LED) in guaranteeing individual rights.  
 
5. Conclusion  
 
Predictive policing technologies are likely to gain increasing traction in the coming years, 
promising, as they do, more efficient policing at a lower cost. Yet, as this contribution has 
demonstrated, the legal framework applicable to these technologies is both unclear and 
unhelpful. When one takes stock, it is apparent that the application of data protection law to 
predictive policing technologies is uncertain and will depend on whether the CJEU endorses 
what Purtova labels its ‘law of everything’ approach. However, even if the data protection rules 
do apply, they may not be of much assistance to those whose fate is determined by predictive 
policing technologies. It can be seen that data protection law does not prevent the use of either 
systemic or individualized predictive policing applications if such applications are provided 
for by law while an array of provisos and conditions detract from the law’s certainty and may 
further limit its utility. For those concerned about the normative implications of this predictive 
capability , the existence of data protection law will be of little comfort. It is perhaps therefore 
little wonder that the normative narrative around automated decision-making is shifting: 
scholars have started to question the hunt for fair and transparent algorithmic decision-making 
and instead have encouraged us to query whether we should be building these systems at all 
(Powles and Nissenbaum, 2018).  
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